We analyze the network of bilateral liquidity swaps (BSAs) among the ASEAN+3 countries. We find that the network has taken the correlation of capital flows in the region into account, in the sense that countries with lower correlation of reserve growth have engaged in larger BSAs. All else equal, a decimal point increase in the correlation of international reserve growth decreases the size of a bilateral swap agreement between 18 and 27%. Moreover, we find that the approximatedly $ 60bn of BSAs have had a limited impact, if any, on government bond spreads so far. Finally, we identify potential gains from inter-regional BSAs.
Introduction
The aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997/8 has been character- 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 2 1 9 4 8 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 2 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 Figure 2 swap combinations have already been activated -the three large economies being more active in signing BSAs. The largest swap arrangement is the one between Japan and South Korea: Japan made no less than $ 10bn of its international reserves available to South Korea, while it could draw $ 5bn from it on demand. However, analyzing the mere existence of an agreement misses out on the information contained in the amount involved in each BSA.
In Table 3 , we show the results of an ordered probit regression using the size of the agreement as the dependent variable. Irrespective of the specification used, we find that three observations are statistically (and economically) Table 1 shows that we have also controlled for the distance between capitals, ratio of GDP per capita, extent of bilateral trade and correlation of output. While all control variables attain the expected sign, they are generally not important. Furthermore, their stock has no correlation with reserves accumulated by Indonesia, Japan or Singapore. The Chinese government has already signed BSAs with all but the last of these. In the case of Japan, the highest gains appear from pooling reserves bilaterally with Indonesia and Thailand. Japan signed a $ 6bn BSA with the first and a $ 3bn with the latter. However, based on the strongly positive co-movement of reserves only, the swap signed between Japan and South Korea seems to be the one where the opt-out clauses would seem most likely to be exercised -as reserve movements of the two are strongly correlated.
Arguably, one limitation of the above analysis is that the patterns of comovements of capital might change over time, in particular during periods of distress. The three latest regressions in Table 1 however show that our results are not particularly sensitive to the selection of the period during which the correlation in reserve growth is computed. Even if we take only the correlation that was observed during the Asian crisis (1997) (1998) (1999) , we do find that pairs of countries with lower reserve growth correlation engage in larger BSAs at the 1% confidence level.
Secondary Bond Markets
Having established the determinants of the size of BSAs in the previous section, we now analyze whether market participants have taken BSAs into account in government bond valuations. In particular, we look at the evolution of secondary market spreads of representative yankee sovereign bonds. 4 The average spread over US Treasury bills in this asset class since 1998 was of 284 basis points, dropping to 228 basis points in the last five years. In order to test the conjecture that BSAs affected bond returns we use monthly data on liquid representative sovereign bond yields for China, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand (see the Appendix for a detailed description of the data and sources). Japan and Singapore are left out as they have obtained AA and AAA sovereign credit ratings, which are associated with negligible risk levels. In the case of South Korea and Thailand, a one percentage point increase in the growth rate of output reduces the risk spread by between 9 and 13 basis points. Also, during this period, increased liquidity as measured by the interest rates on US Treasury bills are associated with reductions in risk spreads.
The estimation results suggest that the effect of BSAs on bond spreads is important only in the case of Malaysia and possibly Indonesia. Only in the case of Malaysia, however, the effect remains important if we include a time trend to account for falling international risk spreads throughout the sample. We were unable to identify any negative effect on risk spreads of sending countries. This should come as no surprise, given the typically very large reserve holdings of these.
Estimates of individual countries, however, should be taken with caution due to micronumerosity. To estimate the effect of BSAs on bond spreads
Zellner's restricted SUR method was also used, allowing for autocorrelation and unequal number of observations for the different countries. We assumed that the error term follows an AR(1) process and allowed for contemporaneous correlation of error terms. We ran a simple OLS regression for each country and transformed the data using Cochrane-Orcutt. We then pooled the transformed data to increase efficiency and ran seemingly unrelated regressions forcing coefficients to be the same across countries. The coefficients of the amount of international reserves and of the total amount made available by bilateral liquidity swaps were allowed to differ. Finally, since our analysis is restricted to the post-Asian crisis period we allowed for a time trend in bond spreads. 5 Pooling all observations, we found that bond spreads tend to be lower the higher the reserves to import ratio, although this effect is only statistically significant at the 10% level for the smaller countries (i.e.
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand). Moreover, a reduction in external indebtness equalling one month of export revenues reduces the 5 We also tested the data with a quadratic term, which turned out not to be significant. risk spread by 10 basis points and an increase in the annual growth rate by one percentage point reduces the spread by 6.6 basis points on average. In general, the effect of BSAs on risk spreads was not found to be significant.
All in all, we conclude that the evidence that BSAs have contributed to the reduction in risk spreads in South East Asia is very weak. This might be due to the fact that international reserve stocks themselves are hardly significant in reducing risk spreads in the area. Moreover, a skeptic investor could point at the opt-out clauses in the BSAs or the high correlation of supply shocks hitting the region to justify the limited effectiveness of the arrangements to reduce risk spreads. was finally signed on January 25th, 2005. We found no evidence that the risk spread on the Thai bond increased relative to other countries in the region during the period in which the renewal of the BSA was uncertain. Therefore, we conclude that even though the network may prove to be important in future, so far it seems that market participants have largely ignored the 6 For an estimation of the correlation matrix of supply shocks in the region see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (2000) .
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effect of BSAs when pricing sovereign bonds.
Cross-Pacific BSAs
In Section 2 we had found that -within the Far East -reserve swaps have indeed been larger between countries that showed no or even negative correlation in reserve variation. That section however did not address the issue of country selection: it was restricted to the countries that have engaged in BSAs. It is quite likely, however, that the largest benefits could be reaped in agreements that go beyond the more immediate economic region. Table 6 shows the correlation of reserve variation of the ASEAN+3 countries with the four largest Latin American economies. It is noteworthy that four of the five largest negative correlations in balance of payments come from cross-pacific pairs: South Korea-Mexico, Japan-Argentina, China-Brazil and Japan-Brazil. Within Latin America, there is a strong negative correlation in reserve movements between Argentina and Mexico. As a counterfactual exercise, we find that if Chile were a member of ASEAN, it would have signed a $ 3bn BSA with South Korea, a $ 4bn BSA with China and a $ 5.5bn BSA with Japan. Chile in turn would have granted access to $ 3.5bn of its own reserves to each of them. In other words, with these three hypothetical BSAs, Chile could prop up its reserves by 83% on demand, while making 70% of its reserves available to China, Japan and South Korea. Alternatively, South Korea and Mexico could have signed a $ 3.5bn BSA to exploit the strongly negative correlation in their reserves.
Concluding Remarks
Our results suggest that policymakers have been efficiently exploiting the potential benefits from within region reserve pooling in the ASEAN+3 countries. BSAs have been signed mostly by countries with large reserve stocks enhancing the insurance provided to small economies in the region. Also, the agreements seem to have taken the correlation matrix of reserve variation into account. This should diminish potential concerns over opt-out clauses. Based on the correlation matrix of reserve variations however, there still seem to be important unexplored opportunities for reserve pooling across economic regions.
There is only weak evidence on the impact of BSAs on secondary market bond valuations. One possibility is that market participants are taking a cautious approach, waiting to price in the mechanism once it has passed a first test. It is important to highlight that the apparent failure to affect market sentiment should not be taken as a sign of the ineffectiveness of the political effort. In our view, the efficiency of the arrangement lies ultimately in the resolution of potential liquidity shortages, irrespective of market sentiments.
Interestingly, as the stated objective of the Chiang Mai Initiative is to deepen financial integration in the region, one could argue that the arrangement might be self-defeating: to the extent that financial integration increases the correlation of shocks hitting the region, it also undermines the credibility of bilateral swap arrangements. The counter argument to this objection is that, if the current configuration is maintained, the major providers of liquidity, namely China, Japan and South Korea -that together hold more than 40% of the world's international reserves are not the most likely to be dragged into a sudden liquidity shortage.
In our view, the notion that the apparent failure of BSAs to affect risk premia is due to the IMF link present in the swaps is less warranted. The liquidity assistance provided to Malaysia and South Korea under the New Miyazawa Initiative -that did not contain the IMF link -does not seem to be more effective in reducing risk premia. Moreover, there is arguably a theoret-ical case for an arbitrator in BSAs, especially so if they are symmetric. If it were not so, it would be easy for a country to undo the request for assistance from a partner by requesting an equivalent assistance at the same time. The conditioning on an externally imposed adjustment program might thus improve the very credibility of the arrangements. 
